In the meantime, five other states have acquired nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa and perhaps, eventually, North Korea. The first three never signed on to the treaty and, for varied reasons, their case is now considered akin to that of the five original possessors. South Africa, however, gave up its pursuit of nuclear weapons when Nelson Mandela came to power at the end of apartheid. North Korea, which signed the NPT in 1985, has been caught twice escaping its obligations, and is now trying to cut a new deal.

Other nations suspected of possessing nuclear weapons, or creating programs include Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan, all of whom ceased their programs, while Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine gave theirs up upon the Soviet Union's dissolution. 

Iraq's nuclear facility was clandestinely attacked by Israel, with any remnants dismantled as a result of the first Gulf War. In recent inspections ordered by the U.N. Security Council, Mohamed El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, confirmed Iraq's non-possession; as well as clarified the accusation that Iraq was acquiring uranium from Niger, stating that it was based on forged documents. 

Most analysts agree that the arms control regime has worked better and longer than expected. All that is needed is to strengthen it to better handle new circumstances and challenges.

But hardcore right-wing advocates within the administration of President George W. Bush have rejected this basic premise, concluding that "traditional nonproliferation has failed," and have embarked on a radically different course of dividing the world into "good guys" and "bad guys."

"Good guys" should be left free of nuclear constraints. It is only "bad guys" or "evil regimes" that, according to its definition, should be preemptively subjected to military action to counter "the world's most destructive technologies." The policy advocated is a fundamentally flawed idea that momentarily designates three countries as an "axis of evil"- Iraq, North Korea and Iran; and is based on a strategy of preemption with an emphasis on force, coercion and selective enforcement as its tools of national policy.

Perkovich, cited above, says: "The radicals' concern for enforcement, therefore, suffers from triple selectivity. It deems some states' nuclear weapons good, while others' are bad. It selects one treaty, the NPT, for enforcement while dismissing others. And it selects some provisions of the NPT- the constraints on others - for enforcement. Such selectivity mocks the equitable rule of law and engenders apathy and resistance from other states that makes stopping WMD proliferation even harder than it would otherwise be." It concludes that the "White House['s] radical new strategy for handling weapons of mass destruction will reduce international cooperation, not increase it." 

Indeed, the contradictions in U.S. policy are clearly demonstrable in its actions against Iraq versus North Korea. Presently, it has launched an unparalleled war on Iraq, and despite tremendous efforts to implicate the country, no evidence for possession of any WMD has been produced. (Hans Blix, chief of inspectors needed more time to completely rule it out: so far in the war nothing has been found, and Iraqis would consider themselves off limits to inspections just as the invaders have no compunctions in this regard).

This, while the same criteria does not apply to North Korea. Not only has North Korea thrown out weapons inspectors in defiance of its U.N. agreements, but it has also revealed that it is taking up building nuclear weapons. The irony cannot be missed. North Korea has been involved in everything the U.S. administration accuses Iraq of doing, and more. Yet, the U.S. will rather negotiate with North Korea more than saber rattle. It is a clear case of hypocrisy and double standards, indicating that the U.S. nefarious, hegemonic intentions.

An often made argument is that Saddam Hussain had a history of using WMD and invading neighboring countries. But the U.S. supplied those chemical and biological weapons when they were used during Iraq's war with Iran, and, internally, on Kurds. And although Saddam's culpability cannot be condoned, there was no moral outrage whatsoever expressed by the U.S. against Hussain at the time. And now, all his neighbors, except Israel, are opposed to this war because they know the sanctions imposed on Iraq have crippled its population, while relentless air strikes over the last 11 years had a devastating effect on its defenses.

This is admitted in a report given by the U.S. National Security Council that a "major difference between the two countries is that a military strike against North Korea is difficult to entertain. Leaving aside nuclear weapons, Pyongyang has a million-strong army and enough artillery to destroy the southern capital of Seoul in the opening minutes of any battle." And, incidentally, the same may happen to the U.S. army stationed there, as well as to all else in that vicinity. Any veneer of credibility of pronouncements against Iraq by the U.S. administration is thus shredded.

Several conclusions could be drawn from Washington's fixation on Iraq. First of all, because it is Arab/Muslim country, which it now sees as its main focus of attention. Muslim lands not only occupy an important strategic area, but also have vast reservoirs of oil; and the U.S. wants to maintain its hold on them in perpetuity as an "unsurpassed" global power. And in this ambition it is aligned with Israel as its regional surrogate, which is very much apparent in the close nexus between Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in their Middle East policies (including the existing brutalities on Palestinians).

And there is another more dangerous message for the world at large. It is that in the era of the Bush foreign policy of preemption, the only way to exist honorably is to have The Bomb. Because, if a "first strike" option is exercised, the U.S. will need to consider the enemy's capabilities before it launches an attack. If that enemy has a well-organized army and is capable of nuclear deterrence, only then will preemption by the United States will be deterred.

Thus, the legacy of the Bush administration will be the rapid spread of nuclear weaponry to all corners of this emerging world. The irony is that this will be initiated by a U.S. president who has the lust for unfettered unilateral domination, and has repeatedly vowed that he would use American might to curtail the spread of WMD to potential rivals.

Again, Perkovich writes: "So long as some states are allowed to possess nuclear weapons legitimately and derive the benefits that flow from them, then other states in the system will want them too - including, perhaps, the successors to the governments the Bush administration currently opposes. The proliferation threat thus stems from the existence and possession of nuclear weapons and theft-prone materials, not merely from the intentions of today's 'axis of evil.'"