So thick is the gloom that commentators sympathetic to General Musharraf are urging him to "take the nation into confidence" (one of the hoariest cliches in Pakistani politics). Convinced of the general's persuasive powers, they expect the national mood to lift if he chooses to explain what is going on. 

Their advice is sound but of doubtful utility when the performance of the top leadership appears to be the principal source of national distress. India policy has been shaped in the presidential office. Nuclear policy is being handled (handled?) at the highest levels. 

When the president declares to CNN's Christiane Amanpour that "...as far as Pakistanis are concerned, it is clear (proliferation) was done by individuals for their own personal financial gain..." nothing is left to the imagination. The line could easily have been taken that the inquiry was not yet over and it wouldn't be proper to prejudge the issue. Instead the definitive comment is volunteered that, yes, some scientists did proliferate for personal gain. 

If you read the transcript of the interview, it becomes clear this was an unforced confession. Amanpour was not homing in on the scientists. Her questions were vague and general. She couldn't have got a more specific answer. No wonder the international wire services flashed this story, for this was the first ever admission from Pakistan that some scientists had indeed proliferated. Where angels might have feared to tread, the president waded in.

Much the same thing happened in the Reuters interview when Gen Musharraf said goodbye to the UN resolutions on Kashmir. The interviewer was not forcing the question. Out of the blue during the course of a somewhat lengthy answer came the giveaway line consigning the UN resolutions to the trashcan of history.

If any civilian leader had spoken like this, scuttling an important plank of national policy through an off-the-cuff remark, he would have been denounced for treason. 

Singly, either of these two fiascos, unilateral concessionism and nuclear mishandling, might well have been absorbed by a nation inured to hardships and policy setbacks. But coming in quick-time one after the other, a left and a right, they have proved to be a slammer on the nation's chin, putting it down for a count of ten. What's more, in January, making you wonder that if this is how the New Year has begun how will it end? 

The calculation may well be that by making scapegoats of Dr A. Q. Khan and his colleagues, and dragging their names through the mud, Pakistan will be applauded for boldness and candor. Chances, however, are that anyone listening to the Amanpour interview will react differently. "Didn't we say Pakistan was a dangerous place, an irresponsible country? Can these Pakistanis be trusted with nuclear weapons? Give me a break." 

Nor is it particularly astute of us to think that by exonerating successive army chiefs (the real guardians of Pakistan's nuclear program), and making sacrificial lambs of A. Q. Khan and a few other scientists, we'll convince the world of our good intentions. The world is not as thickly populated with gullible fools as we seem to imagine. 

Without being too uncharitable, it's hard not to see how this affair, to Pakistan's enduring detriment, has been bungled from the start. Instead of investigating IAEA charges of proliferation thoroughly and quietly, which was the proper thing to do, and waiting for the inquiry to conclude, the Pakistani leadership, marching well ahead of Pakistan's accusers, has confessed to proliferation. 

What on earth for? While we say a few scientists were involved, the world will say it couldn't have happened without the knowledge or connivance of the top army brass. 

And consider the smear campaign against A. Q. Khan in influential sections of the national press. At the national level we may not have much of a reputation for good taste but this campaign really touches the depths for what it ends up tarnishing is not an individual but the nation's self-image. 

Dr Khan has his faults. Who doesn't? But his failings pale into nothing beside his and his team's singular achievement of giving Pakistan, alone of all Muslim countries, a uranium-enrichment capability. 

The story of how Pakistan got the bomb reads like a racy thriller. Bhutto made a fuss about going for a nuclear reprocessing plant from France, even as Khan went ahead with his centrifuge program. The Americans were fooled and stayed fooled for a long time. It was hard going and everything had to be procured secretly. But in the end Khan and his team succeeded. From any angle, it was a huge achievement. 

Now for want of finesse and subtlety, and a bit of backbone, we are imperiling one of Pakistan's few success stories. The people of Pakistan are worried as they have every reason to be. Not lending much credence to what seems like an inspired campaign to besmirch the scientists, they fear the worst: the eventual de-nuclearization of Pakistan. 

As therapy for national anxiety, the nation is being read lessons in realism. For a people prone to excesses of emotionalism this is a welcome reminder. Trouble is that in the current climate of ultra-loyalist pro-Americanism, realism is often hard to distinguish from defeatism. 

Not long ago we held aloft the banner of jihad. That was one frontier of foolishness we zealously guarded. Now we have turned foreign policy into the fine art of collapsing and surrendering at the first hint of pressure. The new name for this is realism and peace. 

A poet might well say: iss qaum ko na jang ka dhang aya, na amn ka (this nation could neither get war right, nor peace). When we succumbed to Powell's telephone call after September 11, the person most surprised was Powell. Read Bob Woodward's account of that episode. Powell wasn't expecting so swift a capitulation. Pakistan has gone one step ahead and now achieved the truly impossible: embarrassed India by the very fervor of its unilateral concessionism. The embarrassment comes from India finding it hard to mask its glee. 

When communication links between India and Pakistan were restored (links snapped by India in the first place) a feeling of euphoria took hold in both countries. But the one-sidedness of the joint statement signed in Islamabad has destroyed that mood. Consider that fatal sentence, "President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner." 

Not that Pakistan should have espoused terrorism. But this was an-uncalled-for formulation implying an admission of Pakistan's guilt and sounding very much like an assurance of good conduct from a vassal to a superior power. 

The Pakistani foreign secretary knew nothing of the joint statement before it was made public. With what face or confidence will he meet his Indian counterpart in Islamabad mid-February? In any case, what will that meeting signify? Both countries are returning to the 'composite dialogue' agreed to in 1997 and reaffirmed at the time of Mr Vajpayee's bus trip to Lahore in 1999. This return to a line dug seven years ago is being hailed as a major triumph. 

We should be conscious of our weaknesses and not magnify our strengths, few as these may be. We shouldn't punch above our weight as we did during the days of jihad but, out of misplaced humility, we shouldn't punch far below it either. 

Between now and November Musharraf is more vital to George Bush and his re-election than Bush is to Musharraf. (What happens after November is a different story.) Iraq is bad enough for the Bush administration. It can't afford getting it more wrong in Afghanistan. Key to the pacification of Afghanistan is Pakistan. 

So what are we scared of? Why is our body language so apologetic when it comes to dealing with the Americans? They may be doing great favors to the Pakistani leadership but not many to Pakistan.