Though a shadow of himself since he suffered a stroke in 1995, King Fahd's historic prestige and political connections at home and abroad kept him and his entourage at the centre of decision-making in Riyadh. Though the new king, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, was left in charge of the day-to-day business of the kingdom in that period he was not able to alter fundamentally the course of Saudi Arabia. The kingdom, which owns the world's largest oil reserves, was in effect on autopilot for a decade. 

So, where will the kingdom be heading, both at home and abroad, under its new ruler? George Bush has described King Abdullah as "a safe pair of hands", but will Saudi Arabia be able to revive its strategic partnership with the United States, which collapsed on 9/11? Despite Abdullah's strenuous efforts, that relationship has not so far been repaired. I fear that perhaps it cannot be. 

More immediate is how Saudi Arabia reacts to the recent dramatic changes in the Middle East. Since the US intervention in Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein, a tide of democracy has been lapping at the corrupt, autocratic regimes in this region. 

The kingdom finds itself the odd man out between the the cautiously reforming countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and the Persian Gulf mini-states on the one hand, and the traditional despotic regimes such as Libya, Sudan, Syria and Iran on the other. 

So which way will Saudi Arabia face? Earlier this year the kingdom cast off its oldest Arab ally, Syria, after the Syrians broke their pledge not to harm Lebanon's former Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, a Saudi citizen and protege of the Saudi Royal Family, by having him assassinated. The kingdom withdrew its ambassador from Libya last year after uncovering a plot by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi to have Abdullah, then Crown Prince, assassinated by a hit squad. Relations with Sudan, which served as a base for anti-Saudi operations until a couple of years ago, remain cool at best. 

Although he masterminded a detente with Iran a decade ago, King Abdullah would also be apprehensive about Iran's new leadership under President Ahmadinejad, who assumes power this weekend. In an interview last month President Ahmadinejad dismissed a suggestion that Iran should create an alliance with the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. "These are not states but petrol stations," he quipped. Many Saudis now assume that Iran will develop a nuclear arsenal and that they, too, may have to seek one if only to restore the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. 

All this means that King Abdullah has nowhere to turn except to the emerging bloc of nations that have opted for social and economic reform and a measure of democracy. But this is fraught with the danger of uncertainty. The kingdom's other important longstanding Arab ally, Egypt, is heading for uncharted waters with the introduction of pluralist elections after pressure from Washington. Relations with Iraq, of course, remain uncertain. No one knows whether its future regime will become part of a new Shia crescent in the region and thus set itself up in a hostile camp to Sunni Muslim Saudi Arabia. 

But what is clear is that Saudi Arabia needs allies in its fight against domestic terrorism. Despite the injection of billions of dollars into religious schools, foundations and associations, the Muslim religious establishment has failed to provide the kingdom with an insurance policy against terrorists engaged in a war of bloody attrition against the House of Saud. 

But to see off the radical threat, King Abdullah not only needs new foreign alliances, but a change of domestic strategies too. In the best-case scenario he would shift the cornerstone of his regime away from the traditional religious-tribal authorities to a new alliance in which the emerging urban middle classes play a central role. This means choosing reform over reaction and political pluralism over faith-based obscurantism. 

King Abdullah has already indicated some preference for such a course. Over the past decade he has broken many taboos. He became the first senior Saudi figure to speak publicly of reform and democracy, and to acknowledge the existence of minorities, notably the Shia, in the kingdom. He also initiated the kingdom's first elections which, though limited to local government and excluding women, struck a chord with most Saudis. His credentials also include the purging of more than 3,000 extremist preachers from the mosques and Koranic schools, the creation of a human rights commission, and the hosting of a series of public debates on women's rights. 

King Abdullah would have to work fast to establish an agenda that addresses the needs of a nation where two thirds of the population are aged below 30. So if the new king opts for a strategy of change, the question remains whether the dynasty, and the broader establishment, would go along with it. Despite much speculation about an impending power struggle within the House of Saud, the new king would be able to cope with any opposition. The fact that King Abdullah is where he is, on a throne coveted by almost all of his 19 surviving half-brothers, is a sure indication of his political savvy and talent for survival.