Islam, in common with the revealed faiths, believes in another world after death in this life. It is the hereafter wherein we get the rewards or punishments as we deserve for the deeds we committed while living in this world. 

God is the transcendental, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent reality who created and controls all that exists in this universe (or the universes, as is known now). He created humans, male and female, as His representatives on earth, and as such gave humans a degree of independence and freewill. But all that is given is as a trust, and we are answerable to Him all our actions in the Hereafter.

The Quran tells us, “And He has subjected to you whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on the earth – all from Him. Indeed in that are signs for a people who give thought.” (45:13).“And if you should count the favors of Allah, you could not enumerate them. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.” (16:18) 

The Hereafter is what makes sense of this life; none of the injustices, corruption or evil will go without account and no good deed will go without full reward. We are tested with good and bad, the hardship and ease as part of life. The Qur’an describes the Hereafter and deals with arguments for its existence at length so that no doubt is left in our mind for its existence. 

God created prophets and messengers throughout the history of mankind. They spoke with God and received His Guidance and called others to live by it. These prophets and messengers included Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus among others described in Holy Scriptures, Torah, Bible and the Qur’an.

Mohammad was the last of these messengers with the final testament of Qur’an. Muhamad, who preached Islam was born in 570 CE in Mecca, and died in 623 CE in Medina (Arabia). 

While other scriptures were corrupted by human interpolation, Qur’an is the same, word for word, as revealed to Muhammad. It corrects and completes the earlier messages. 

A believer is constantly asking God, “Our Lord! Give us in this world that which is good and in the hereafter that which is good and save us from the torment of the fire (2:202). And asks God for guiding him in prayers, “Show us the straight way, the way of those on whom you have bestowed Your Grace, those whose (portion) is not wrath, and who go not astray.” 

In response to this supplication, the second chapter of Quran describes the divine guidance thus,

“This is the Book, in it is Guidance sure, without doubt, to those who fear God, who believe in the Unseen, are steadfast in prayer, and spend out of what We have provided for them; and who believe in the Revelation sent to you, and sent before your time, and (in their hearts) have assurance of the Hereafter. They are on (true guidance) from their Lord, and it is these who will prosper.” 

When Muslims were still a small community in Mecca, at about 615-619 AD the following verses from Surah Al Muminun, Chapter 23 were revealed as a prediction of coming events that believers will succeed and rewarded with paradise,

“The believers must (eventually) win through – those who humble themselves in their prayers; who avoid vain talk; who are active in deeds of charity; who abstain from sex, except with those joined to them in the marriage bond, or (the captives) whom their right hands possess- for (in their case ) they are free from blame, but those whose desires exceed those limits are transgressors. Those who faithfully observe their trusts and covenants; and who (strictly) guard their prayers – These will be the heirs, who will inherit Paradise: They will dwell therein (forever).” 

A few months before the Prophet passed away and Muslims conquered Mecca, the following verses of surah Al Nasr were revealed showing God’s grace and mercy, and and man’s duty of humility and gratitude to God. 

“When comers the help of Allah and Victory. And you see the people enter Allah’s religion in crowds. Celebrate the praises of your Lord, and pray for His forgiveness. For He is often-returning (in Grace and Mercy).” (110-1-4) 

God informs a believer, male or female doing good deeds, will be rewarded paradise in the Hereafter as in the following verses; “Whosoever, does righteousness, whether male or female, while he is a believer, We will surely cause him to live a good life, and We will surely give them their reward in the Hereafter) according to the best of what they used to do.”(16:97). 

And very relevant to our topic, the following verses addressed to believers doing good that He will grant them success, establish Islam jn authoriy, change their fear into security in Surah An-Nur as follows:

“Allah has promised those among you who believe and do righteous deeds, that He will of a surety, grant them in the land, inheritance (of power) as He granted it those before them; that He will establish in authority their religion – the one which He has chosen for them; and that He will change their (state), after the fear in which they lived, to one security and peace; “they will worship Me (alone) and not associate anyone with Me.” (24: 55-56) 

And the following verses addressed to the Prophet and success as the right of believers, from Surah Rum.

“We did indeed send, before you, messengers, to their(respective) peoples, and they came to them with clear proofs. Then those who transgressed, We meted out Retribution: And it was from Us their right, to those who believed. ”(30:47). 

Pew Research: Islam and Muslims are fastest growing population group in the world 

According to Pew Research Center, the well-known demographic organization based in Washington, DC there were 1.8 billion Muslims in the world as of 2015, roughly 24% of the global population and the fastest growing religion. Indeed, if the current trends continue the number of Muslims is expected to exceed the number of Christians by the end of century. 

Although many countries in the Middle East-North Africa region, where the religion originated in the seventh century are heavily Muslim, but a majority of Muslims, 62%, globally live in the Asia-Pacific region, including large populations in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Turkey.

Indonesia is currently the country with the largest Muslim population, but Pew Research Center projects that India will have that distinction by the year 2050 (while remaining a majority Hindu country), with more than 300 million Muslims. 

In a January 27, 2011 Pew Research article on the Future of the Global Muslim population, the world’s Muslim population is expected to increase by about 35% in the next 20 years, rising from 1.6 billion in 2010 to 2.2 billion by 2030, according to new population projections. 

Globally, the Muslim population is forecast to grow at about twice the rate of the non-Muslim population over the next two decades, with an average annual growth rate of 1.5% for Muslims, compared with 0.7% for non-Muslims. If current trends continue, Muslims Muslims will make make up 26.4% of the world’s total projected population of 8.3 billion billion in 2030, up from 23.4% of the estimated 2010 world population of 6.9 billion. 

With a continuation of current trends , 79 countries will have a million or more Muslim inhabitants in 2030, up from 72 countries now. A majority of world’s Muslims (about 60%) will continue to live in Asia-Pacific region, while about 20% will live in in the Middle East and North Africa, as is the case today. But 

Pakistan is expected to surpass Indonesia as the country with the single largest Muslim population. The portion of world’s Muslims living in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to rise; in 20 years, for example, more Muslims are likely to live in Nigeria than in Egypt. Muslims will remain relatively small minorities in Europe and the Americas, but they are expected to constitute a growing share of total population in these regions. 

In the United States, for example, the population projections show the number of Muslims more than doubling over the next two decades, rising from 2.6 million in 2010 to 6.2 million in 2030, in large part because of immigration and higher-than-average fertility among Muslims.  

The Muslim share of U.S. population (adults and children) is projected to grow from 0.8% in 2010 to 1.7% in 2030, making Muslims roughly as numerous as Jews or Episcopalians in the United States today. Although several European countries will have substantially higher percentages of Muslims, the United States is projected to have a larger number of Muslims by 2030 than any European of European countries other than Russia and France. 

In Europe as a whole, the Muslims share of the population is expected to grow by nearly one-third over the next 20 years, rising from 6% of the region’s inhabitants in 2010 to 8% in 2030. In absolute numbers, Europe’s Muslim population is is projected to grow from 44.1 million in 2010 to 58.2 million in 2030. The greatest increases –driven primarily by continued migration - are likely to occur in Western and Northern Europe, where Muslims will be approaching double-digit percentages of the population in several countries. 

Sunni constitute the majority of world Muslim population, with 85% of the total. and the Shia are minority 15% at about 200 million worldwide. Sunni Muslims will continue to make up an overwhelming majority of Muslims in 2030 (87-90%). The portion of the Shia may decline slightly, largely because of low fertility in Iran where more than a third of the world’s Shia Muslims live. 

There are two major factors behind the rapid projected growth of Islam, and both involve simple demographics. For one, Muslims have more children than members of other religious groups. Around the world, each Muslim woman has an average of 2.9 children, compared with 2.2 for all other groups combined. Muslims are also the youngest (median age of 24 years old in 2015) of all major religious groups, seven years younger than the median age of non-Muslims. As a result, a larger share of Muslims already are, or will soon be, at the point in their lives when they begin having children, This, combined with high fertility rates, will fuel Muslim population growth. 

World Muslims are united in their beliefs and practices 

A Pew Research Executive Summary dated August 9, 2012 titled The World Muslims: Unity and Diversity described Islamic faith practices observed by Muslims. It said that the world’s Muslims are united in their belief in God and the Prophet Muhammad and are bound together by such religious practices as fasting during the holy month of Ramadan and almsgiving to assist people in need. 

The survey, which involved more than 38,000 face-to-face interviews in over 80 languages, found that in addition to the widespread that there is only one God and that Muhammad is His Prophet, large percentages of Muslims around the world share other articles of faith, including belief in angles, heaven, hell and fate (or predestination). 

There is broad agreement on the importance of faith in their life At least eight-in-ten Muslims in every country surveyed in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia and South Asia say that religion is very important in their lives. Across the Middle East and North Africa roughly six-in-ten or more say the same. 

Traditionally, Muslims adhere to several articles of faith. Among the most widely known are: there is only one God; God has sent numerous messengers, with Muhammad being His final Prophet; God has revealed Holy Scriptures, including the Quran; God’s angels exist, even if people cannot see them; there will be a Day of Judgment, when God will determine whether individuals are consigned to heaven or hell; and God’s will and knowledge are absolute, meaning that people are subject to fate or predestination. 

As previously noted, belief in one God and the Prophet Muhammad is nearly universal among Muslims in most countries surveyed. Although the survey asked only respondents in sub-Saharan Africa whether they consider the Quran to be the word of God, the finding in that region indicate broad assent. Across most of the African nations surveyed, more than nine-in-ten Muslims say the Quran is the word of God, and solid majorities say it should be taken literally, word for word. 

The survey respondents in all 39 countries whether they believed in the existence of angels. In Southeast Asia, South Asia and Middle East-North Africa region, belief in angels is nearly universal. In Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa more than seven-in-ten also say angels are real. Even in Southern and Eastern Europe, a median of 55% share this view. 

While there a broad agreement on the core tenants of Islam, however, Muslims across the 39 countries and territories surveyed differ significantly in their level of religious commitment, openness to multiple interpretations of their faith and acceptance of various sects and movements.  

Generational differences are also apparent. Across the Middle East and North Africa, for example, Muslims 35 and older tend to place greater emphasis on religion and to exhibit higher levels of religious commitment than do Muslims between the ages of 18 and 34. 

The expression “Inshallah” (“If God wills”) is a common figure of speech among Muslims and reflects the Islamic tradition that the destiny of individuals, and the world, is in the hands of God. And indeed, the survey finds that the concept of predestination, or fate, is widely accepted accepted among Muslims in most parts of the world. In four of the five regions where the question was asked, medians of about nine-in-ten (88%-93%) say they believe in fate, while a median of 57% express this view in Southern and Eastern Europe. 

The survey also asked about the existence of heaven and hell. Across the sis regions included in the study, a median of more than seven-in-ten Muslims say that paradise awaits those who have lived 

righteous lives, while a median of at least two-thirds say hell is the ultimate fate of those who do not live righteously and do not repent. 

Unifying Rituals

Along with the core beliefs discussed above, Islam is defined by “Five Pillars” – basic rituals that are obligatory for all members of the Islamic community who are physically able to perform them. The Five Pillars include: the profession of faith (shahadah); daily prayer (salat); fasting during the holy month of Ramadan 9sawm); annual almsgiving to assist the poor or needy (zakat); and participation in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca at least once during one’s lifetime (hajj). Two of these – fasting during Ramadan and almsgiving – stand out as communal rituals that are especially widespread among Muslims across the globe. 

Fasting during the month of Ramadan, which according to Islamic tradition is required of all healthy, adult Muslims, is part of an annual rite in which individuals place renewed emphasis on the teachings of the Quran. The survey finds that many Muslims in all six major geographic regions surveyed observe the month-long, daytime fast during Ramadan. In Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, medians of more than nine-in-ten say they fast annually (94%-99%). 

Many Muslims in Southern and Eastern Europe and in Central Asia also report fasting during Ramadan. Annual almsgiving, which by custom is supposed to equal approximately 2.5% of a person’s total wealth, is almost as widely observed as fasting during Ramadan. In Southeast Asia and South Asia, a median of roughly nine-in-ten Muslims (93% and 89%, respectively) say they perform zakat. At least three-quarters of respondents in the countries surveyed in the Middle East and North Africa (79%) and sub-Saharan Africa (77%) also report that they perform zakat. 

These common practices and shared beliefs help explain why to many Muslims, the principles of Islam seem both clear and universal. As mentioned above, half or more in most of the 39 countries surveyed agree that there is only one way to interpret the teachings of Islam. 

It is important to keep in mind that despite lower levels of religious commitment on some measures, majorities across most of Central Asia and Southern and Eastern Europe nonetheless subscribe to core tenets of Islam, and many also report that they observe such pillars of the faith as fasting during Ramadan and annual almsgiving. 

Of all the countries surveyed, only in Russia do Muslims ages 18-34 place significantly more importance on religion than Muslims 35 and older (48% vs 41%). Younger Muslims in Russia also tend to pray more frequently (48% do so once a day or more, compared with 41% of older Muslims). 

The biggest generational differences are found in the Middle East and North Africa. In Lebanon, for example, Muslims ages 35 and older are 28 percentage points more likely than younger Muslims to pray several times a day, 20 points more likely to attend at least weekly and 18 points more likely to read the Quran daily. 

Across the six regions included in the survey, women and men tend to be very similar in terms of the role religion plays in daily life. This hold true for the importance that both sexes place on religion, as well as for the frequency with which they observe daily rituals, such as prayer and reading (or listening to) the Quran. For example, among the countries surveyed in Central Asia, a median of 43% of Muslim women say religion is very important in their lives, compared with 42% of men. When it comes to prayer, a median of 31% of women and 28% of men in Central Asia pray several times a day. And nearly equal percentages of women (8%) and men (6%) across the region say they read or listen to the Quran daily. The one exception to this pattern is mosque attendance: Women are much more likely than men to say they never visit the local mosque. This gender gap is largest in South Asia and Central Asia. 

Pew Research: Overwhelming percentages of Muslims in many countries want Sharia

“Overwhelming percentages of Muslims worldwide want Sharia to be official law of the land”, according to a worldwide survey by the Pew Research Center overview dated April 30, 2013. But many supporters of Sharia say it should apply only to to their country’s Muslim population. 

Sharia, or Islamic law, offers moral and legal guidance for nearly all aspects of life- from marriage and divorce, to inheritance and contracts, to criminal punishments. Sharia, in its broadest definition, refers to the ethical principles set down in the Quran, and examples of the Prophet Muhammad. 

Support for making Sharia is highest in South Asia (median of 84%). Medians of at least six-in-ten Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa (64%), the Middle East-North Africa region (74%) and Southeast Asia (77%) also favor enshrining sharia as official law. 

Within regions, support for enshrining as official law is particularly high in some countries with predominantly Muslim populations such as Afghanistan and Iraq. But support for sharia is not limited to countries where Muslims make up a majority of the population. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, Muslims constitute less than a fifth of the population in Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, and Uganda; yet in each of these countries, at least half of Muslims (52%-74%) say they want sharia to be official law of the land. 

Conversely, in some countries where Muslims make up more than 90% of the population, relatively few want their governments to codify Islamic law; this is the case in Tajikistan (27%), Turkey (12%), and Azerbaijan (8%). Distinct legal and political cultures may help explain the differing levels of support for sharia.  

Many of the countries surveyed in Central Asia and Southern and Eastern Europe share a history of separating religion and the state. The polices of modern Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, for example, emphasized the creation of a secular government; other countries in these two regions experienced decades of secularization under the communist rule.  

By contrast, governments in many of the countries surveyed in South Asia and the Middle East-North Africa region have officially embraced Islam. 

As discussed above, regardless of whether they support making sharia the official law of the land, the Muslims around the world overwhelmingly agree that in order for a person to be moral, he or she must believe in God and agree to practice certain behaviors. 

Muslims around the world support democracy and freedom of expression. 

Most world Muslims express support for democracy, and most support freedom of expression. At the same time, many Muslims want religious leaders to have at least some influence in political matters. 

While Muslims widely embrace democracy and religious freedom, many also want religion to play a prominent role in politics. Medians of at least six-in-ten in Southeast Asia (79%), South Asia (69%), and the Middle East and North Africa (65%) say religious leaders should have at least some influence over political matters. And medians of at least a quarter across these three regions who would like to see religious leaders exert a large influence on politics. 

Devout Muslims tend to be more supportive of religious leaders playing a role in politics. Most Muslims are comfortable practicing their faith in the contemporary world. Relatively few say there is an inherent conflict between religiously devout and living in a modern society, and the prevailing view in most countries surveyed is that is there is no inherent conflict between religion and science.  

However, most Muslims think Western music, movies and television pose a threat to morality in their country. 

The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State 

Noah Feldman, a Professor of Law and founding director of program on Jewish and Israel Law at Harvard University wrote a 189-page book on the “Fall and Rise of the Islamic State” published by the Princeton University in 2012. An expert of the Fall and Rise of the Islamic State said that democracy and Islamic state were the only two prominent forms of governments that are resurrected.  

Democracy had limited success in a small-city Greek state for a couple of hundred years, disappeared and then resurrected some two thousand years later by non-Greeks living under radically different conditions for whom democracy was a word handed down in philosophy books and embraced only fitfully and after some serious reinterpretation. 

Islamic governments started by the Prophet Muhammad and his followers withdrew from Mecca to their own political community, which grew and lasted just after WWI – almost exactly thirteen hundred years. Islamic governments ruled states that ranged from fortified towns to transcontinental empires. 

These states separated in time and space and size were so Islamic that they did not need the adjective to describe themselves. A common constitutional theory, developed and changing over the course was practiced in all. A Muslim ruler governed according to God’s law, expressed through principles and rules of the sharia that were expounded by scholars. The ruler’s fulfillment of the duty to command what the law required and ban what was prohibited made his authority lawful and legitimate. 

In the 19th century distinctively Islamic governments began to falter. The Ottoman Empire whose rulers claimed to lead the Islamic world as caliph, adopted a series of new governing arrangements championed by internal reformers and pressed by Western debt-holders.  

Though the empire remained formally Islamic, epochal changes like a legislature and legislative code shook the foundations of the traditional unwritten constitution that had prevailed under traditional Islamic rule. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed in the wake of its defeat in WWI, its lands were divided into Western spheres of influence, guided, if not governed by France and England.  

The new Turkish government that eventually established itself on the Ottoman Empire’s Anatolian rump declared in being secular and abolished the caliphate. In both symbolic and practical terms, the Islamic state died in 1924. 

Yet today the Islamic state rides again. Its reach is not limited to fascinating anomalies like Saudi Arabia, which claims to adhere to the ancient Islamic constitution in its purest form. By revolution, as in Iran, or by constitutional referendum as in Iraq and Afghanistan, governments in majority-Muslim countries are increasingly declaring themselves Islamic. Their new constitutional regimes replace secular arrangements adopted over the last century with government based in some way on the shari’a.  

The trend is with them In Muslim countries running the geographical span from Morocco to Indonesia, substantial majorities say that the shari’a Islamic law should be a source of law for their states; and in important and populous countries like Egypt and Pakistan, large majorities say that Islam law should be the only source of legislation.  

Wherever democratic elections are held in Muslim countries, large numbers of citizens vote for shari’a-oriented political parties that are best characterized as Islamist. The programs of these parties differ little from place to place. They embrace democratic elections and basic rights. They promise economic reform, and end to corruption, and above all, the adoption of the shari’a as a source or the source of law. 

This movement toward the Islamic state is riding a wave of nostalgia, but it is also looking forward. The designers and advocates of the new Islamic state want to recapture the core of what made the traditional Islamic great. They declare their allegiance to the old one. There is no turning back the clock of history, no matter what anyone says. 

The Islamists’ aims are both religious and worldly. To be sure, they seek to follow the God’s will. But they also explicitly say that they want to restore just government and world significance to the countries in which they live.

Without these stated goals and the chance that it might be possible to accomplish them, the Islamists would have little or no popular support. Political actors in the contemporary Muslim world, from ordinary voters to elites, take Islam seriously as a basis for government only to the extent that they believe it can make a practical difference in places where both the state and society itself have fallen on hard times. 

Feldman asked the question, Can the new Islamic state succeed? This question has enormous amplifications for the residents of Muslim countries and for the world that must engage with Islamic states and movements that promote Islam as a political solution. To answer t requires getting behind the slogans that characterize both sides of the debate.  

In the first place, we must get a clear sense of what the traditional Islamic state actually was, and why it worked so well for so many centuries until it ultimately declined and fell. Only then will we see fully why the idea of Islamic state is so popular today. 

We will also then be able to figure out whether the new Islamic state might be to recapture some relevant features of the old state that would make it work. Most importantly, we will be able to identify the major challenges that will the new Islamic states – challenges that will shape their behavior towards their own citizens and toward the rest of world. 

Feldman said he wanted to propose an interpretation of the Islamic constitution in its old and new forms that would help clarify where we are today and where we are going with respect to government in the Muslim world. The future of Islamic state is very much under formation but so is its past and it is not over because it is being debated and its outcome remains undetermined.  

In this sense, his approach takes seriously the arguments of those Muslims who are trying to reconstruct an Islamic state that will succeed in the face to contemporary conditions because for them the past is not dead but a living, breathing material from which future will be built. According to Feldman much of the analysis of the Muslim world insisted on artificial distinction between the past and a rupture with forward looking modernity.  

He said the collapse of the traditional Islamic state surely took place and the caliphate was abolished, and described the occurrence of events in the Ottoman empire, despite various reforms adopted in an incomplete manner. 

Feldman said the call for an Islamic state is first and foremost a call for law, a legal state that would be justified by law and governed through it. The advocates of the new Islamic state often say it was the abandonment of the Islamic legal order that led to its collapse. It is certainly that the abandonment of law that doomed the modern, non-Islamic states to fail. 

According to Feldman the problem with returning to shari’a is that law is rather a set of social practices, and it can operate only through the regular, repetitive conduct of people acting in concert. The approach taken by governments such as in Iraq and Afghanistan that are trying to create themselves as new Islamic states has been to adopt the structures of liberal constitutional democracy and try to fuse them with Islamic principles.

This arrangement is very different from putting all legal matters into shari’a courts. They follow the well-established trend in the Muslim world of giving the shari’a courts jurisdiction only over personal matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance.  

In other words, the new Islamic states are not seeking to re-create the institutional authority that the scholars held in the old Islamic state. They are adopting an experimental approach of democratizing the shari’a by calling on the legislature instead to act upon such matters and enact them through passing laws.  

Once adopted, those laws would have validity and force primarily because the legislature enacted them, not because they came from God. This is an attempt, however underdeveloped, to make the legislature into an institution that would engage with the ideal law, not just the application of power. The constitutions of these countries also prohibit the legislature from passing laws that violate core tenants of Islam. In effect this amounts to the constitutionalization of the shari’a. 

 Feldman said he wanted to propose an interpretation of the Islamic co9nstitution in its old and new forms that will clarify where we are today and where we are going with respect to government in the Muslim world.  

The future of the Islamic state is very much under formation, but so is its past, which is not really over so long as its meaning is being debated and its outcome remains undetermined, so he dealt with the arguments of those Muslims who are trying to reconstruct an Islamic state that will succeed in the face of contemporary conditions. This topic has been dealt with by others Muslim intellectuals, so I am going to forgo to discuss this part of his book here. 

The democratization and constitutionalization of the shari’a contemplated by the new Islamic states represent an attempt to resuscitate the Islamic state as a legal state through institutions that would both justify it by law and allow it to govern through law. But those introducing it do it in a new way that a tension that was much less salient in the thought of classical state; the potential conflict between the divine law and human law.  

The scholars who shaped the thought of classical constitution of Islamic state were well aware of this conflict but they acknowledged the right of ruler to enact binding regulations that did not contradict the shari’a. It is more complicated I the new Islamic state Feldman said that the greatest challenge facing the new Islamic constitution derives from the uncertainty about identifying who is in charge of specifying the meaning of shari’a and by what authority?  

It was scholars in the old Islamic state, but who is now. The scholars still exist today, but with much reduced stature. He concluded that the answer depended on finding an institutional authority with the capacity to stand up and check executive power in the name of law.  

If the new Islamic state can find an institution to fill the role traditionally played by the scholars, it has a reasonable chance of establishing political justice and, through it, popular legitimacy. According to Feldman, it could be legislature, if it can succeed in climbing out from under the weight of executive dominance to oversee the limit of executive power.  

In theory, it could be a judicial body exercising the power of supervisory authority over a legal system freed of systematic corruption. 

There are problems that Feldman could not foresee. For example, in Pakistan there is a Council of Islamic Ideology, which is a constitutional body for giving legal advice on Islamic issues to the government and parliament.  

It is to recommend laws conforming to the Quran and Sunnah to the parliament and provincial assemblies, advise the parliament, government of Pakistan on any question referred to the council as to a proposed law is or is not repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. 

However, Pakistan has been ruled, directly or indirectly, by army after its independence in 1947. In February 2022 the military dislodged former Prime minister Imran Khan’s government following a no confidence vote. As reported by Maddha Afzal of the Brookings Institute on April 3, 2024 the country held its elections marked by by a pre-poll crackdown on its most popular political party, Tahreek Insaf and arrested thousands of its members and senior leadership.  

Behind it was the military usual playbook of propping up the party it favored. Pakistan’s army is also America’s partner of choice, through periods of both military and civilian rule. Also the U.S. anxieties about its nuclear arsenal might fall into the wrong hands. Pakistan’s military projects itself as the most competent institution, and America has internalized that notion. But Pakistan’s army consumes a major portion of its budget and is the cause of its economic problems. 

On the other hand, the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) established in Sokoto in the northern Nigeria as a national conference of Nigerian Muslims. In the South-West of the country, another organization formed after independence in 1960 was the United Muslim Council, but it was embraced by few Muslims in the Western zone.

The two organizations amalgamated together in 1973 with headquarters in the Nigerian capital of Abuja. The first president of NSCIA was Sultan Siddiq Abubakar III, the then Sultan of Sokoto. Now under the president are two deputies President-General for the North and South Nigeria with its national secretariat at Abuja, the Nigeria capital. 

Nigeria gained independence from the colonial rule in 1960, but had a number of military coups until 1999. After 1999, 12 states in Northern Nigeria have established Sharia courts; these states are Zamfara, Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, Bauchi, Borno, Jigawa, Kebbi, Yobe, Kaduna, Niger, and Gombe.  

On October 27, 1999, Ahmed Sani Yerima the then-governor of Zamfara state introduced shari’a law in his state. Eleven other states with a majority Muslim population followed suit. Many Christians living in the country protested against the move, riots ensued and many Christians and Muslims died as a result. 

Oly Muslims can be tried in a sharia court, and sharia laws do not apply to non- Muslims in these states. Imam Nuruddeen Lemu of the Dawah Institute based in Minna, Niger State recalled the fear people had of what shari’a implied, and some suspected Muslim dominance and that Christians could be oppressed and admitted that Muslims had not done their homework to alleviate fears.  

He said many non-Muslims deemed shari’a law as barbaric, and allowed people to be punished by having their arms severed, and that non-Muslims are forced to convert to Islam. 

Sharia law has a long tradition in this part of the world. It was practiced in the Sokoto Caliphate and Borno African empire prior to British colonial rule. Both were prosperous and powerful entities, and gained the respect of its people.

The Sharia courts have been in existence now for about 25 years and most voters notice the move has already created beneficial benefits. Shari’a enactment is in conformity with the demand of global Muslims. 

Of the various critical reviews on the book, I choose one written by Asifa Quraishi, Assistant Professor of Law at University of Wisconsin for her response under the title of “Taking Shari’a Seriously.”  

At the outset in a note she says Feldman’s use of contemporary legal-political terms like ... constitutional... separation of powers... and even...state strikes to me at times as awkwardly anachronistic but I see its usefulness in the ready associations these terms have in the readers minds.  

Nevertheless I remain concerned that these terms without careful caveats and explanations may ultimately detract from the overall persuasiveness of his presentation. 

Quraishi said, “Paradigm shifts are not easy and Noah Feldman is taking on a big one in his latest book, the fall and Rise of the Islamic State, where he set out to re-conceptualize shari’a in the American mind as an Islamic rule of law.

This is a valuable contribution to a discourse in which Muslim desires for shari’a are often dismissed as naïve steps backwards into theocracy, or worse, condemned as demands for gruesome and misogynistic punishment or even terrorism.  

Against these assumptions, Feldman confidently insisted, quite correctly in my opinion that classical Islamic legal and political institutions were organized in a “constitutional” structure that operated as a “separation of powers” between the temporal rulers and the religious legal scholars. In these systems, Feldman says, because God’s law (shari’a) was always supreme.  

It was respect for law that held rulers in check, their authority operating in a complex (although unwritten) shared power arrangement with the scholars who interpreted shari’a for society.

Feldman believes that an appreciation of the primary feature of these traditional Islamic states. that the rule of law stood above the rule of individual men -will help explain why the idea of Islamic state is so popular today, especially in regions where corrupt dictators are the norm.  

He imagines ways a new Islamic state could recapture some of the key features of this old order, suggesting models for modern Islamic constitutionalism. His book end with the bold recommendation that a United States that is committed to rule of law around the world should support new Islamic legal and constitutional institutions when they make their play of legitimacy on the basis of of promising justice and the rule of law via shari’a. 

It is obvious what sort of criticism Feldman’s portrayal invited. Any description of a rule of law in which God’s law is supreme sounds to most Americans like a theocracy. And if Islamic constitutionalism means a shari’a-based rule of law in which religious law could trump democratic legislation. 

It is expected that Americans committed to to secular democracy would oppose any form of Islamic constitutionalism, modern or otherwise. Moreover, looking around the world at Islamic states today, many find that the sorts of laws promoted as shari’a mandated conflict with global civil and human rights norms.  

If it is believed that Islamic laws demands, for example, that an Islamic state should stone adulterers and give men more divorce rights than women, then no version of a shari’a-inspired separation of powers will alleviate the problems many have with the substance of Islamic law itself. 

These are powerful arguments only partially answered in Feldman’s book. Where he does not answer them directly, appropriate conclusions could be extrapolated by the reader. But because the paradigm shift Feldman attempts is so great, many of his readers are not likely to to do so, leaving his ultimate conclusions vulnerable. 

She offered a critique of Feldman’s book that focused on how his thesis could be strengthened by more direct engagement with these important contemporary concerns. First, Feldman’s arguments could be framed with clearer language in order to distinguish the various various types of law implicated in his presentation.

She said why without more careful delineation of the differences between shari’a and fiqh, and fiqh and siyasa, some very important normative distinctions inherent in the field of Islamic law can be lost.  

Then she commented on the modern shari’a constitutional models imagined by Feldman pointing out the confusion that can result from amalgamation of fiqh and siyasa lawmaking.

Feldman knew it but some of the descriptive language he used could obscure the reality. 

Towards the end of the book Feldman commented that a “new Islamic state, if it is to succeed, can learn from the aspects of traditional practice, but it must do for itself the difficult and slow work of establishing new institutions with their own ways of operating that will gradually achieve legitimacy.” 

That was an insightful comment and one that Quraishi hoped his readership will take to heart. She believed, as Feldman did, that every society is entitled to legal and political institutions that reflect their own culture, values, heritage, and aspirations. This premise was a central feature of this book and features prominently in much of the Feldman’s body of work to date.  

The Fall and Rise, he does an honorable an honorable job of bringing legitimacy and respect to Islamically-motivated political activism. This is not an easy task, given the heavy suspicion of Islamism in current western minds.  

Yet Feldman is persistent. These groups are not crazy religious zealots, he insists, but rather a modern manifestation of sincere and laudable desire for justice. And their justice – seeking sentiments is rooted in a broad based affinity for shari’a, which itself deserves respect as arule of law.  

He realizes that, for those working in the field of Islamic law and constitution, it is important to take seriously the ideas of Islamist political parties, whether or not ones agrees with their overall platform. This is why Noah Feldman’s work is is valuable paradigm-shifting material. He powerfully argues why popular calls for recognition of religious law should be addressed, not suppressed.  

His book offered American readers a plausible way to take them seriously, and suggested alternatives to what is often the liberal impulse to find ways to make the Islamic resurgence go away and if Feldman succeeded in nothing more than brining respect to the word shari’a in American minds, he will have made a huge and invaluable contribution.  

Quraishi said, “But his book has the potential to accomplish even more and if it can help shift American attitudes about Islamic constitutionalism from dismissive condescension of an oxymoron to respect for a legitimate –if-complex-pursuit, then Feldman’s book can have a paradigm-shifting influence on global constitutional discourses.

Quraishi offered the present critique in the spirit of supporting this potential and although she disagreed with particular institutional scenarios Feldman imagined for modern Islamic constitutionalism, nevertheless strongly appreciated his overall project and the door it opens to more productive discussion and debate of this important world topic.  

Quraishi said Feldman’s approach displays optimism, not suspicion, and it looked in the direction of mutual respect and engagement, which is the best long-term antidote to violence threatened by today’s religious-potential conflicts. She described it as a valuable work. 

However along with Islamic commitment we need to constantly pray to our Creator and Lord for success, because nothing could happen unless He wills it and it is He who determines the end our endeavors. We ask Him to enable us to be of service for the welfare of humankind while seeking His pleasure.