Empty heads and full pockets
The PA has come under increasing scrutiny in the aftermath of Annapolis, notes Khaled Amayreh
Just back from Annapolis, and with no tangible achievements to
present to, let alone impress, a people long disillusioned with
American-sponsored "peace conferences", Palestinian Authority (PA)
officials have been trying desperately to convince the Palestinians
that "this time it is going to be serious."
Former but still influential negotiator Saeb Ereikat has described
upcoming negotiations with Israel as "a real battle" with the same
ferocity of a military confrontation and with similar tactics, except
that it is fought at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.
But if battle it is, it is nearly certain that Palestinian
negotiators are marching to it unprepared, and with a vague strategy
and inadequate tactics. Some Palestinian legal experts are visibly
dismayed by the way the PA is preparing itself for the fateful
negotiations with Israel, with all its notorious deceitfulness and
prevarication.
According to former PA Labour Minister Ghassan Al-Khatib, the main
problem besetting the Palestinian negotiating position lies in the
perceptions of the leadership. "Our negotiators, like our leadership,
give priority to political realities often at the expense of legal
principles. This is why the negotiations are not be going to be
conducted according to the rule of international law."
In an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly, Khatib pointed out
that the PA believed it was unrealistic, though perfectly legal from
the perspective of international law, to have as a starting position
the Partition Resolution of 1947 instead of United Nations Security
Council resolutions 242 and 338. "They think it is difficult to revert
to the past and that the international community would reject such a
step on our part."
Professor Ali Jerbawi of Beir Zeit University disagrees. He told the Weekly
that the PA should have made the 1947 partition plan, not UN
resolutions 242 and 338, their opening negotiating position. "They are
na�ve and ignorant. Even my grandmother understood that in order to
have a reasonable price for one's commodity, one had to demand first
the highest possible price in order to be able to get the wanted price."
Jerbawi went on arguing that if negotiations were to be conducted
pursuant of international law, Palestinian negotiators would be
perfectly justified in reminding Israel and the world that Israel's
pre-1967 borders were merely military borders or armistice lines, not de jure
boundaries and that the Palestinians were not legally or morally bound
to recognise the current borders of what is widely known as Israel
proper.
Jerbawi is right and to the point. The armistice agreements of 1949
allowed Israel to gain 77 per cent of the total land of mandatory
Palestine. This means that Israel arrogated 22 per cent more of
Palestine than the area allotted to it by the 1947 Partition Resolution
181.
More to the point, it was amply clear that the armistice agreements
were dictated exclusively by military, not political, considerations.
This implies that Israel had no legal right to possess the territories
occupied during the 1948 hostilities beyond the lines specified in the
partition resolutions.
In other words, the only de jure legal borders Israel has
ever had are those which were specified in the partition resolution and
Israel's pre-1967 borders are actually no more than de facto boundaries.
Interestingly, this view was unambiguously stipulated in the
Armistice Agreement itself in Article II, Paragraph 2, which states the
following: "It is also recognised that no provision of this agreement
shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either
party hereto." Similarly, Article VI, Paragraph 9 states the following:
"The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI of this
agreement are agreed upon by the Parties without prejudice to future
territorial settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either party
relating thereto."
Raja Shehada is a prominent British-educated lawyer based in
Ramallah and a former advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team
during the Oslo-era talks between the PA and Israel.
When asked if he thought Palestinian negotiators were na�ve in
demanding Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 as
their starting negotiation position, he said he more or less agreed
with this prognosis. "I can't really answer this question. With regard
to the negotiating process, I believe things from outside don't appear
exactly as they are in reality. Besides, it is very likely that our
negotiators and the PA itself are under intense pressure."
Shehada, nonetheless, opined that failure to adopt the 1947
Partition Resolution as a starting negotiating position was inexcusable
from the legalistic view point. "If they couldn't adopt this stand
inside the negotiating room, they could do it outside the negotiating
room, and they would have nothing to lose."
Shehada illustrated the risks and dangers inherent in "our
negotiators' non- appreciation of legality and rule of international
law." "You see, these are our main assets, namely international law, UN
resolutions, the ruling of the International Court of Justice, and if
we don't watch out, we will be overwhelmed by Israeli hegemony, even at
the negotiating table."
Palestinian mediocrity, or even incompetence, in negotiations with
Israel, is not imputed to lack of financial and human resources. The
main reason may well lie in corruption at the highest levels and
virtual absence of accountability.
The PLO Negotiations Affairs Department (NAD) has at its disposal
the services of the Negotiations Support Unit (NSU), which has received
tens of million of dollars of funds, but has done very little to make
Palestinian negotiators better equipped to face their Israeli
counterparts.
Just take a look at the document formulated jointly between Israel
and the PA at the last minute at the Annapolis conference. This
document, which the NSU helped formulate, was completely void of any
call for ending the manifestly criminal blockade of Gaza, the removal
of Israeli checkpoints and roadblocks in the West Bank or release of
Palestinian prisoners from Israeli dungeons and detention camps.
Moreover, not a word was mentioned about freezing Israeli settlement
expansions.
The NSU is funded and effectively controlled by the Adam Smith
Institute (ASI), a think-tank based in London which is vulnerable to
pressure from pro- Israeli circles. For example, two years ago, the ASI
forced the NSU to fire two highly-qualified Palestinian-American
lawyers, Michael Tarazi and Diana Butto, for going too far in defending
Palestinian rights, especially during TV debates with Israeli spokesmen.
According to inside sources, one of the persons who pushed for
firing the two Palestinian-American lawyers is Glenn Robinson, the
author or co-author of the controversial RAND project "The Arc: A
Formal Structure for a Palestinian State".
Eventually, Tarazi and Butto were accused by pro-Israeli lobbyists,
including some British MPs, of hindering the development of the
Palestinian Ministry of Information and of not ensuring sufficient
coordination with the PLO. Of course, these accusations were merely red
herrings.
ASI defines itself as the UK's leading innovator of practical
market economic policies. The institute's main focus is on reforming
governments and state enterprises in order to promote choice,
competition, and user-focus. It works through research, reports,
conferences, advice and media debate.
Since 1999, ASI relegated nearly $50 million to the Ramallah-based
NSU despite the fact that NSU staff and employees were sitting in their
homes, doing nothing, since the peace process was paralysed.
A British diplomat based in Israel explained why the British
government, which pays the lion's share of the NSU budget, and other
donors, continued to pay all these millions to the ASI and NSU, despite
the international boycott of the Palestinians from March 2006 to June
2007. "We were hoping that negotiations would be resumed anytime."
But, the main problem lies with the Palestinian Authority itself
and its relations with the NSU, mostly based on cronyism and nepotism.
The author sought to contact the NSU in Ramallah, but received a
hostile response. One lady told me "why don't you go and negotiate with
Israel. Maybe you could do a better job."
Caption: Released Palestinian prisoners wave from atop a bus as they
arrive at Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's headquarters in the
West Bank after their release from an Israeli jail
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/874/_re61.htm - C a p t i o n 2:
Released Palestinian prisoners wave from atop a bus as they arrive at
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's headquarters in the West Bank
after their release from an Israeli jail
� Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved