Bi ismillahir rahmanir raheem
ENDNOTES:
[1] Abdul Wadod Shalabi, Islam: Religion of Life
(2nd ed., Dorton, 1989), 10. This is the purport of the famous hadith
: �The best generation is my own, then that which follows them, then that which
follows them�. (Muslim, Fada�il al-Sahaba, 210, 211, 212, 214)
[2] The Khalifa was killed by Muslim rebels from Egypt,
whose grievances included his alleged �innovation� of introducing a standard
text of the Holy Koran. (Evidently the belief among some modern Muslims that
there can be no such thing as a �good innovation� (bid`a hasana) has a
long history!) For the full story, see pages 63-71 of M.A. Shaban, Islamic
History AD 600-750 (AH 132): A New Interpretation (Cambridge, 1971).
[3] Shaban, 73-7.
[4] For the Kharijtes see Imam al-Tabari, History,
vol. XVIII, translated by M. Morony (New York, 1987), 21-31. Their monstrous
joy at having assassinated the khalifa `Ali ibn Abi Talib is recorded on page
22.
[5] For an account of the historical development of
the fiqh, see Ahmad Hasan, The Early Development of Islamic
Jurisprudence (Islamabad, 1970); Hilmi Ziya Ulken, Islam Dusuncesi
(Istanbul, 1946), 68-100; Omer Nasuhi Bilmen, Hukuki Islamiyye ve Istalahati
Fikhiyye Kamusu (Istanbul, 1949-52), I, 311-338.
[6] For a brief account of Shi�ism, see C. Glasse, The
Concise Encyclopedia of Islam (london, 1989), 364-70.
[7] Fada�ih al-Batiniya, ed. `Abd al-Rahman
Badawi (Cairo, 1964).
[8] For a detailed but highly readable account of the Mongol
onslaught, see B. Spuler, History of the Mongols, based on Eastern and
Western Accounts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (London, 1972);
the best-known account by a Muslim historian is `Ala� al-Din al-Juwayni, Tarikh-i
Jihangusha, translated by J.A. Boyle as The History of the
World-Conqueror (Manchester, 1958).
[9] For the slaughter of the ulema, see the dramatic
account of Ahmad Aflaki, Manaqib al-`Arifin, ed. Tahsin Tazici (Ankara,
1959-61), I, 21, who states that 50,000 scholars were killed in the city of
Balkh alone.
[10] The critical battle was fought in 873/1469, when the
Mongol ruler of Iran was defeated by the Turkomans of the (Sunni) Ak Koyunlu
dynasty, who were in turn defeated by Shah Isma`il, an extreme Shi`ite, in
906-7/1501, who inaugurated the Safavid rule which turned Iran into a Shi`i
country. (The Cambridge History of Iran, VI, 174-5; 189-350; Sayyid
Muhammad Sabzavari, tr. Sayyid Hasan Amin, Islamic Political and Juridical
Thought in Safavid Iran [Tehran, 1989].)
[11] The Kharijites represent a tendency which has
reappeared in some circles in recent years. Divided into many factions, their
principles were never fully codified. They were textualist, puritanical and
anti-intellectual, rejected the condition of Quraish*te birth for their Imam,
and declared everyone outside their grouping to be kafir. For some
interesting accounts, see M. Kafafi, �The Rise of Kharijism�, Bulletin of
the Faculty of Arts of the University of Egypt, XIV (1952), 29-48; Ibn
Hazm, al-Fisal fi�l-milal wa�l-nihal (Cairo, 1320), IV, 188-92; Brahim
Zerouki, L�Imamat de Tahart: premier etat musulman du Maghreb (Paris,
1987).
[12] Probably because he had written a book celebrating the
virtues of the caliph `Ali. See Ibn Hajar al-`Asqalani, Tahdhib al-Tahdhib
(Hyderabad, 1325), I, 36-40.
[13] See, for example, Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni, al-Burhan
fi usul al-fiqh (Cairo, 1400), ��1189-1252.
[14] Ibn Qutayba, Ta�wil Mukhtalif al-Hadith (Cairo,
1326). Readers of French will benefit from the translation of G. Lecomte: Le
Traite des divergences du hadith d�Ibn Qutayba (Damascus, 1962). There is
also a useful study by Ishaq al-Husayni: The Life and Works of Ibn Qutayba
(Beirut, 1950). Mention should also be made of a later and inmost respects
similar work, by Imam al-Tahawi (d. 321): Mushkil al-Athar (Hyderabad,
1333), which is more widely used among the ulema.
[15] Imam Abu�l-Wahid al-Baji (d. 474), Ihkam
al-Fusul ila `Ilm al-Usul, ed. A. Turki (Beirut, 1986/1407), ��184-207;
Imam Abu Ishaq al-Sirazi (d. 476), al-Luma` fi usual al-fiqh (Cairo,
1377), 17-24; Juwayni, ��327-52, 1247; Imam al-Shafi`i, tr. Majid Khadduri, Al-Shafi`i�s
Risala: Treatise on the Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge,
1987), 103-8. Shafi`i gives a number of well-known examples of Koranic texts
being subject to takhsis. For instance, the verse �As for the thief,
male and female, cut of their hands as a retribution from Allah,� (5:42)
appears to be unconditional; however it is subject to takhsis by the hadith
which reads �Hands should not be cut off for fruits, nor the spadix of a palm
tree, and that the hand should not be cut off unless the price of the thing
stolen is a quarter of a dinar or more.� (Malik, Muwatta�, Abu Daud, Sunan;
see Shafi`i, Risala, 105.)
[16] Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic
Jurisprudence (Cambridge, 1991), 356-65. This excellent book by a prominent
Afghan scholar is by far the best summary of the theory of Islamic law, and
should be required reading for every Muslim who wishes to raise questions
concerning the Shari`a disciples.
[17] The verses in question were: 2:219, 4:43, and
5:93. See Kamali, 16-17.
[18] Kamali, 150; Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist�s
Primer, tr. Imran Nyazee and Muhammad Abdul Rauf (Reading, 1994), 97. This
new translation of the great classic Bidayat al-Mujtahid, only the first
volume of which is available at present, is a fascinating explanation of the
basic arguments over the proof texts (adilla) used by the scholars of
the recognized madhhabs. Ibn Rushd was a Maliki qadi, but
presents the views of other scholars with the usual respect and objectivity.
The work is the best-known example of a book of the Shari`a science of `ilm
al-khilaf (the �Knowledge of Variant Rulings�; for a definition of this
science see Imam Hujjat al-Islam al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa min `ilm al-usul,
[Cairo, 1324] I, 5).
[19] Kamali, 150 quoting Shatibi, Muwafaqat,
III, 63.
[20] Kamali, 154-160; Baji, ��383-450; Shirazi, 30-5;
Juwayni, ��1412-1454; Ghazali, Mustasfa, I, 107-129. The problem was
first addressed systematically by Imam al-Shafi`i. �There are certain hadiths
which agree with one another, and others which are contradictory to one
another; the abrogating and the abrogated hadiths are clearly
distinguished [in some of them]; in others the hadiths which are
abrogating and abrogated are not indicated.� (Risala, 179.) For cases in
which the Holy Koran has abrogated a hadith, or (more rarely) a hadith
has abrogated a Koranic verse, see Ghazali, Mustasfa, I, 124-6; Baji,
�429-39; Juwayni, �1440-3. The sunna is able to abrogate the Koran because
it too is a revelation (wahy); as Imam al-Baji explains it, �The Blessed
Prophet�s own sunnas do not in reality abrogate anything themselves;
they only state that Allah has cancelled the ruling of a Koranic passage. Hence
the abrogation, in reality, is from Allah, whether theabrogating passage is in
the Koran or the Sunna.� (Baji, �435.)
[21] For this as an instance of abrogation, see
Shafi`i, Risala (Khadduri), 133.
[22] Muslim, Jana�iz, 100.
[23] Kamali, 154.
[24] Kamali, 155; see also Shafi`i, Risala (khadduri),
168.
[25] Sayf ad-Din Ahmed Ibn Muhammad, Al-Albani
Unveiled: An Exposition of His Errors and Other Important Issues (London, 2nd
ed., 1415), 49-51; Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist�s Primer,
168-170; Shafi`i, Risala (Khadduri), 199-202.
[26] M.Z. Siddiqi, Hadith Literature, its Origins,
Development and Special Features (Revised ed. Cambridge, 1993), 3, 40, 126.
[27] Defects in the matn can sometimes make a
hadith weak even if its isnad is sound (Siddiqi, 113-6).
[28] Kamali, 361; Bilmen, I, 74-6, 82-4. The classification
of revealed texts under these headings is one of the most sensitive areas of usul
al-fiqh.
[29] Kamali, 361.
[30] Kamali, 362.
[31] Kamali, 235-44; Ghazali, Mustasfa, 1,
191,2; Juwayni, �343.
[32] For some expositions of the difficult topic of qiyas,
see Kamali, 197-228; Shirazi, 53-63; Juwayni, ��676-95; Imam Sayf al-Din
al-Amidi (al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam, Cairo, 1332/1914), III, 261-437,
IV, 1-161.
[33] Kamali, 363-4.
[34] The accessible English translation of his best-known
work on legal theory has already been mentioned above in note 15.
[35] The question is often asked why only four
schools should be followed today. The answer is straightforward: while in
theory there is no reason whatsoever why the number has to be four, the
historical fact is that only these four have sufficient detailed literature to
support them. In connection with the hyper-literalist Zahiri madhhab, Ibn
Khaldun writes: �Worthless persons occasionally feel obliged to follow the
Zahiri school and study these books in the desire to learn the Zahiri system of
jurisprudence from them, but they get nowhere, and encounter the opposition and
disapproval of the great mass of Muslims. In doing so they often are considered
innovators, as they accept knowledge from books for which no key is provided by
teachers.� (Muqaddima, tr. F. Rosenthal [Princeton, 1958], III, 6.)
[36] These are (in order of length, shortest first), al-Khulasa,
al-Wajiz, al-Wasit and Basit. The great Imam penned over a hundred other
books, earning him from a grateful Umma the title �Hujjat al-Islam� (The Proof
of Islam). It is hardly surprising that when the ulema quote the famous sahih
hadith �Allah shall raise up for this Umma at the beginning of each
century someone who will renew for it its religion,� they cite Imam al-Ghazali
as the renewer of the fifth century of Islam. See for instance Imam Muhammad
al-Sakhawi (d. 902AH), al-Maqasid al-Hasana fi bayan kathirin min al-ahadith
al-mushtahira `ala al-alsina (Beirut, 1405), 203-4, who lists the
�renewers� as follows: `Umar ibn `Abd al-`Aziz, al-Shafi`i, Ibn Surayj, Abu
Hamid al-Isfaraini, Hujjut al-Islam al-Ghazali, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Ibn Daqaq
al-`Id, al-Balqini. Imam Ibn `Asakir (d. 571AH), in his famous work Tabyin
Kadhib al-Muftari fima nusiba ila al-Imam Abi�l-Hasan al-Ash`ari, ed. Imam
Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari (Damascus, 1347, reproduced Beirut, 1404), 52-4, has
the following list: `Umar ibn `Abd al-`Aziz, al-Shafi`i, al-Ash`ari,
al-Baqillani, al-Ghazali.
[37] Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Ihya `Ulum al-Din
(Cairo: Mustafa al-Halibi, 1347), III, 65.
[38] �The most characteristic qualities of the great ulema
are dignity and serenity, respect for other scholars, compassionate concern for
the Umma, and following the Prophet, upon whom be blessings and peace, whose
view was always broad, his wisdom perfect, and his toleration superb.� Imam
Yusuf al-Dajawi (d. 1365AH), Maqalat wa-Fatawa (Cairo: Majmu` al-Buhuth
al-Islamiya, 1402), II, 583. `True fairness is to regard all the Imams as
worthy; whoever follows the madhhab of a Mujtahid because he has
not attained the level of Ijtihad, is not harmed by the fact that other
imams differ from his own.� (Shatibi, I`tisam, III, 260.) There are many
examples cited by the scholars to show the respect of the madhhabs for
each other. For instance, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Samadi (d. 1662), a pious scholar
of Damascus, once prayed to be given four sons, so that each might follow one
of the recognized madhhabs, thereby bringing a fourfold blessing to his
house. (Muhammad al-Amin al-Muhibbi, Khulasat al-atar fi a`yan al-qarn
al-hadi `ashar [Cairo, 1248], I, 48.) And it was not uncommon for scholars
to be able to give fatwas in more than one madhhab (such a man
was known technically as mufti al-firaq). (Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhayl
Tarikh Dimasq [Beirut, 1908], 311.) Hostility between the Madhhabs was
rare, despite some abuse in the late Ottoman period. Al-Dhahabi counsels his
readers as follows: �Do not think that your madhhab is the best, and the one
most beloved by Allah, for you have no proof of this. The Imams, may Allah be
pleased with them, all follow great goodness; when they are right, they receive
two rewards, and when they are wrong, they still receive one reward.�
(al-Dhahabi, Zaghal al-`Ilm wa�l-Talab, 15, quoted in Sa`id Ramadan
al-Buti, Al-Lamadhhabiya Akhtar Bid`a tuhaddid al-Shari`a al-Islamiya, 3rd
edition, Beirut, 1404, 81.) The final words here (�right � reward�) are taken
from a well-known hadith to this effect (Bukhari, I`tisam, 21.)
[39] Most notoriously N. Couson, Conflicts and
Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence (Chicago, 1969), 43, 50, 96; but also I.
Goldziher, Louis Ardet and Montgomery Watt.
[40] It will be useful here to refute an accusation made by
some Orientalists, and even by some modern Muslims, who suggest that the
scholars were reluctant to challenge the madhhab system because if they
did so they would be �out of a job�, and lucrative qadi positions,
restricted to followers of the orthodox Schools, would be barred to them. This
is a particularly distasteful example of the modern tendency to slander men
whose moral integrity was no less impressive than their learning: to suggest
that the great Ulema of Islam followed the interpretation of Islam that they
did simply for financial reasons is insulting and a disgraceful form of ghiba
(backbiting). In any case, it can be easily refuted. The great ulema of the
past were in almost every case men of independent means, and did not need to
earn from their scholarship. For instance, Imam Ibn Hajar had inherited a
fortune from his mother (al-Sakhawi, al-Daw� al-Lami` li-Ahl al-Qarn
al-Tasi` (Cairo, 1353-5), II, 36-40). Imam al-Suyuti came from a prominent
and wealthy family of civil servants (see his own Husn al-Muhadara fi akhbar
Misr wa�l-Wahira [Cairo, 1321], I, 153, 203). For examples of scholars who
achieved financial independence see the editor�s notes to Ibn Jam`a�s Tadhkirat
al-Sami` fi Adab al-`Alim wa�l-Muta`allim (Hyderabad, 1353), 210: Imam
al-Baji was a craftsman who made gold leaf: �his academic associates recall
that he used to go out to see them with his hand sore from the effects of the
hammer� (Dhahabi, Tadhkira, III, 349-50); while the Khalil ibn Ishaq,
also a Maliki, was a soldier who had taken part in the liberation of Alexandria
from the Crusaders, and often gave his fiqh classes while still wearing
his chain mail and helmet (Suyuti, Husn al-Muhadara, I, 217.) And it was
typical for the great scholars to live lives of great frugality: Imam
al-Nawawi, who died at the age of 44, is said to have damaged his health by his
ascetic lifestyle: for instance, he declined to eat of the fruit of Damascus,
where he taught, because it was grown on land whose legal status he regarded as
suspect. (al-Yafi`I, Mir�at al-Janan wa-`Ibrat al-Yaqzan [Hyderabad,
1338], IV, 1385.) It is not easy to see how such men could have allowed motives
of financial gain to dictate their approach to religion.
[41] A mujtahid is a scholar qualified to
perform ijtihad, defined as �personal effort to derive a Shari`a
ruling of the furu` from the revealed sources.� (Bilmen, I, 247.) His
chief task - the actual process of derivation - is called istinbat,
originally signifying in Arabic �bringing up water with difficulty from a
well.� (Bilmen, I, 247.)
[42] �When Allah�s Messenger, upon him be blessings and
peace, wished to send Mu`adh ibn Jabal to the Yemen, he asked him: �How will
you judge if an issue is presented to you for judgement?� �By what is in
Allah�s Book,� he replied. �And if you do not find it in Allah�s Book?� �Then
by the Sunna of Allah�s Messenger.� �And if it is not in the Sunna
of Allah�s Messenger?� �Then I shall strive in my own judgement� (ajtahidu
ra�yi). (Abu Daud, Aqdiya, 11.)
[43] Kamali, 366-393, especially 374-7; see also
Amidi, IV, 219-11; Shirazi, 71-2; Bilmen, I, 247, 250, 251-2.
[44] Kamali, 386-8. Examples of such men from the time of
the Tabi`un onwards include �Ibrahim al-Nakha`I, Ibn Abi Layla, Ibn Shubruma,
Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Hasan ibn Salih, al-Awza`i, `Amr ibn al-Harith, al-Layth
ibn Sa`d, `Abdullah ibn Abi Ja`far, Ishaq ibn Rahawayh, Abu `Ubayd al-Qasim ibn
Salam, Abu Thawr, Ibn Khuzayma, Ibn Nasr al-Marwazi, Ibn Mundhir, Daud al-Zahiri,
and Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, may Allah show them all His mercy.� (Bilmen, I, 324.)
It should be noted that according to some scholars a concession (rukhsa)
exists on the matter of the permissibility of taqlid for mujtahid:
Imam al-Baji and Imam al-Haramayn, for instance, permit a mujtahid to
follow another mujtahid in cases where his own research to establish a
matter would result in dangerous delay to the performance of a religious duty.
(Baji, �783; Juwayni, �1505.)
[45] Kamali, 388; Bilmen, I, 248.
[46] �The major followers of the great Imams did not simply
imitate them as some have claimed. We know, for instance, that Abu Yusuf and
al-Shaybani frequently dissented from the position of Abu Hanifa. In fact, it
is hard to find a single question of fiqh which is not surrounded by a
debate, in which the independent reasoning and ijtihad of the scholars,
and their determination to locate the precise truth, are very conspicuous. In
this way we find Imam al-Shafi`i determining, in his new madhhab, that
the time for Maghrib does not extend into the late twilight (shafaq);
while his followers departed from this position in order to follow a different
proof-text (dalil). Similarly, Ibn `Abd al-Barr and Abu Bakr ibn
al-`Arabi hold many divergent views in the madhhab of Imam Malik. And so
on.� (Imam al-Dajawi, II, 584.)
[47] �Whenever a mujtahid reaches a judgement
in which he goes against ijma`, or the basaic principles, or an
unambiguous text, or a clear qiyas (al-qiyas al-jali) free of any
proof which contradicts it, his muqallid is not permitted to convey his
view to the people or to give a fatwa in accordance with it � however
no-one can know whether this has occurred who has not mastered the principles
of jurisprudence, clear qiyas, unambiguous texts, and anything that
could intervene in these things; and to know this one is obliged to learned usul
al-fiqh and immerse oneself in the ocean of fiqh.� (Imam Shihab
al-Din al-Qarafi, al-Furuq (Cairo, 1346), II, 109.)
[48] The ulema usually recognize seven different degrees of
Muslims from the point of view of their learning, and for those who are
interested they are listed here, in order of scholarly status. (1,2) The mujtahidun
fi�l-shar` (Mujtahids in the Shari`a) and the mujtahidun
fi�l-madhhab (Mujtahids in the Madhhab) have already been
mentioned. (3) Mujtahidun fi�l-masa�il (Mujtahids on Particular
Issues) are scholars who remain within a school, but are competent to exercise ijtihad
on certain aspects within it which they know thoroughly. (4) Ashab
al-Takhrij (Resolvers of Ambiguity), who are competent to �indicate which
view was preferable in cases of ambiguity, or regarding suitability to
prevailing conditions�. (5) Ashab al-Tarjih (People of Assessment) are
�those competent to make comparisons and distinguish the correct (sahih)
and the preferred (rajih, arjah) and the agreed-upon (mufta biha)
views from the weak ones� inside the madhhab. (6) Ashab al-Tashih
(People of Correction): �those who could distinguish between the manifest (zahir
al-riwaya) and the rare and obscure (nawadir) views of the schools
of their following.� (7) Muqallidun: the �emulators�, including all
non-scholars. (Kamali, 387-9. See also Bilmen, I, 250-1, 324-6.) Of these seven
categories, only the first three are considered to be mujtahids.
[49] This is explained by Imam al-Shatibi in the
context of the following passage, all of which is quoted here to furnish a
further summary of the orthodox position on taqlid. �A person obliged to
follow the rules of the Shari`a must fall into one of three categories.
He may be a mujtahid, in which case he will practice the legal
conclusions to which his ijtihad leads him. [II] He may be a complete muqallid,
unappraised of the knowledge required. In his case, he must have a guide to
lead him, and an arbitrator to give judgements for him, and a scholar to
emulate. Obviously, he follows the guide only in his capacity as a man
possessed of the requisite knowledge. The proof for this is that if he knows,
or even suspects, that he does not in fact possess it, it is not permissible
for him to follow him or to accept his judgement; in fact, no individual,
whether educated or not, should think of following through taqlid
someone who he knows is not qualified, in the way that a sick man should not
put himself in the hands of someone whom he knows is not a doctor. [III] He may
not have attained to the level of the Mujtahids, but he understands the dalil
and its context, and is competent to understand it in order to prefer some
rulings over others in certain questions. In his case, one must either
recognize his preferences and views, or not. If they are recognized, then he
becomes like a mujtahid on that issue; if they are not, then he must be
classed alone with other ordinary non-specialist Muslims, who are obliged to
follow Mujtahids. (al-I`tisam [Cairo, 1913-4] III, 251-3.)
An equivalent explanation of the status of the muttabi`
is given by Amidi, IV, 306-7: �If a non-scholar, not qualified to make ijtihad,
has acquired some of the knowledge required for ijtihad, he must follow
the verdicts of the Mujtahids. This is the view of the correct scholars,
although it has been rejected by some of the Mu`tazilites in Baghdad, who
state: "That is not allowable, unless he obtains a clear proof (dalil)
of the correctness of the ijtihad he is following." But the correct
view is that which we have stated, this being proved by the Koran, Ijma`
and the intellect. The Koranic proof is Allah�s statement, "Ask the people
of remembrance if you do not know," which is a general (`amm)
commandment to all. The proof by Ijma` is that ordinary Muslims in the
time of the Companions and the Followers used to ask the mujtahids, and
follow them in their Shari`a judgements, while the learned among them would
answer their questions without indicating the dalil. They would not
forbid them from doing this, and this therefore constitutes Ijma` on the
absolute permissibility of an ordinary Muslim following the rulings of a mujtahid.�
For Amidi�s intellectual proof, see note 51 below.
[50] A muqallid is a Muslim who practices taqlid,
which is the Shari`a term for �the acceptance by an ordinary person of
the judgement of a mufti.� (Juwayni, �1545.) The word �mufti�
here means either a mujtahid or someone who authentically transmits the
verdict of a mujtahid. �As for the ordinary person [`ammi], it is
obligatory [wajib] upon him to make taqlid of the ulema.� (Baji,
�783.) The actual choice of which mujtahid an ordinary Muslim should
follow is clearly a major responsibility. �A muqallid may only make taqlid
of another person after carefully examining his credentials, and obtaining
reliable third-party testimony as to his scholarly attainments� (Juwayni,
�1511). (Imam Ibn Furak, however holds that a mujtahid�s own self-testimony
is sufficient.) Imam Juwayni goes on to observe (�1515) that is is necessary to
follow the best mujtahid available; whichis also the positoin of Imam
al-Baji (�794). See also Shirazi (p. 72): �It is not permissible for someone
asking for a fatwa to ask just anyone, lest he ask someone who has no
knowledge of the fiqh. Instead it is obligatory (wajib) for him
to ascertain the scholar�s learning and trustworthiness.� And Qarafi (II, 110):
�The Salaf, may Allah be pleased with them, were intensely reluctant to
give fatwas. Imam Malik said, "A scholar should not give fatwas
until he is regarded as competent to do so both by himself and by others."
In other words, the scholars must be satisfied of his qualifications. Imam
Malik did not begin to give fatwas until he had been given permission (ijaza)
to do so by forty turbaned ones [scholars].�
[51] �The dalil for our position is Allah�s
commandment: So ask the people of remembrance, if you do not know. For
if we forbade taqlid, everyone would need to become an advanced scholar,
and no-one would be able [have time] to earn anything, and the earth would lie
uncultivated.� (Shirazi, 71.) �The intellectual proof [of the need for taqlid]
is that if an issue of the furu` arises for someone who does not possess
the qualifications for ijtihad then he will either not adopt an Islamic
ruling at all, and this is a violation of the Ijma`, or, alternatively,
he will adopt an Islamic ruling, either by investigating the proofs involved,
or by taqlid. But an adequate investigation of the proofs is not
possible for him, for it would oblige him, and all humanity, fully to
investigate the dalils pertaining to the issues, thereby distracting
them from their sources of income, and leading to the extinction of crafts and
the ruin of the world.� (Amidi, Ihkam, IV, 307-8.) �One of the dalils
for the legitimacy of following the verdicts of the scholars is our knowledge
that anyone who looks into these discussions and seeks to deduce rulings of the
Shari`a will need to have the right tools, namely, the science of the
rulings of the Koran and Sunna and usul al-fiqh, the principles of
rhetoric and the Arabic language, and other sciences which are not easily
acquired, and which most people cannot attain to. And even if some of them do
attain to it, they only do so after long study, investigation and very great
effort, which would require that they devote themselves entirely to this and do
nothing else; and if ordinary people were under the obligation to do this,
there would be no cultivation, commerce, or other employments which are
essential for the continuance of humanity - and it is the ijma` of the
Umma that this is something which Allah ta`ala has not obliged His slaves to
do. � There is therefore no alternative for them to following the ulema.�
(Baji, �793.)
[52] �There is ijma` among the scholars that this
verse is a commandment to whoever does not know a ruling or the dalil
for it to follow someone who does. Almost all the scholars of usul al-fiqh
have made this verse their principle dalil that it is obligatory for an
ordinary person to follow a scholar who is a mujtahid.� (al-Buti, 71;
translated also in Keller, 17.)
[53] See also Dajawi, II, 576: �The Companions and
Followers used to give fatwas on legal issues to those who asked for
them. At times they would mention the source, if this was necessary, while at
other times they would limit themselves to specifying the ruling.� Al-Ghazali (Mustasfa,
II, 385) explains that the existence of taqlid and fatwa among
the Companions is a dalil for the necessity of this fundamental
distinction: �The proof that taqlid is obligatory is the ijma` of
the Companions. For they used to give fatwas to the ordinary people and
did not command them to acquire the degree of ijtihad for themselves. This
is known necessarily (bi�l-darura) and by parallel lines of transmission
(tawatur) from both the scholars and the non-scholars among them.� See
also Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima (Bulaq ed., p. 216): �Not all the Companions
were qualified to give fatwas, and Islam was not taken from all of them.
That privilege was held only by those who had learnt the Koran, knew what it
contained by what of abrogated and abrogating passages, ambiguous (mutashabih)
and perspicuous (muhkam) expressions, and its other special features.�
And also Imam al-Baji (�793): �Ordinary Muslims have no alternative but to
follow the Ulema. One proof of this is the ijma` of the Companions, for
those among them who had not attained the degree of ijtihad used to ask
the ulema of the Companions for the correct ruling on something which happened
to them. Not one of the Companions criticized them for so doing; on the
contrary, they gave them fatwas on the issues they had asked about,
without condemning them or telling them to derive the rulings themselves [from
the Koran and Sunna].� See also Imam al-Amidi: in note 49 above.
A list of the muftis among the Companions is
given by Juwayni (��1494-9); they include the Four Khalifas, Talha ibn
`Ubaydillah, `Abd al-Rahman ibn `Awf, and Sa`d ibn Abi Waqqas. Others were not muftis,
such as Abu Hurayra, who despite his many narrations of hadiths was never known
for his judgements (�1497). Shirazi (p. 52) confirms the obvious point that
some Companions are considered more worthy of being followed in legal matters
than others.
[54] As we have seen above, the ulema regard a mastery of
the Arabic language as one of the essential qualifications for deriving the Shari`a
directly from the Koran and Sunna. See Juwayni, ��70-216, where this is
stressed. Juwayni records that Imam al-Shafi`i was so expert in the Arabic
language, grammar and rhetoric that at a very young age he was consulted by the
great philologist al-Asma`i, who asked his help in editing some early and very
difficult collections of Arabic poetry. (Juwayni, �1501.) We also learn that
Imam `Ibn al-Mubarak, the famous traditionalist of Merv, spent more money on
learning Arabic than on traditions [hadith], attaching more importance on the
former than the latter, and asking the students of hadith to spent twice as
long on Arabic than on hadith � al-Asma`i held that someone who studied hadith
without learning grammar was to be categorized with the forgers of hadith.�
(Siddiqi, 84-5.)
[55] Published in 6 volumes in Cairo in 1313 AH.
Another work by him, the Kitab al-Zuhd (Beirut, 1403), also contains
many hadiths.
[56] Published in 13 volumes in Bombay between 1386 and
1390.
[57] Edited by M.M. al-A`zami, Beirut, 1391-97.
[58] This is an important collection of hadiths who accuracy
Imam al-Hakim al-Nisaburi considered to meet the criteria of Imams al-Bukhari
and Muslim, but which had not been included in their collections. Published in
four large volumes in Hyderabad between 1334-1342.
[59] Needless to say, the amateurs who deny taqlid
and try to derive the rulings for themselves are even more ignorant of the
derivative sources of Shari`a than they are of the Koran and Sunna.
These other sources do not only include the famous ones such as ijma`
and qiyas. For instance, the fatwas of the Companions are
considered by the ulema to be a further important source of legislation. �Imam
al-Shafi`i throughout his life taught that diya (bloodmoney) was
increased in cases of crimes committed in the Haramayn or the Sacred Months,
and he had no basis for this other than the statements of the Companions.�
(Juwayni, �1001.)
[60] There is a version of this hadith in Tirmidhi (Hudu,
2), but attached to an isnad which includes Yazid ibn Ziyad, who is weak.
[61] Ibn Abi Shayba, Musannaf, XI, 70.
[62] Sakhawi, 74-5.
[63] Sakhawi, 742.
[64] For a complete list of the most famous scholars of
Islam, and the madhhabs to which they belonged see Sayf al-Din Ahmad, Al-Albani
Unveiled, 97-9.
[65] For these writers see Ahmad ibn al-Naqib
al-Misri, tr. Nuh Keller, Reliance of the Traveller (Abu Dhabi, 1991),
1059-60, 1057-9. The attitude of Ibn al-Qayyim is not consistent on this issue.
In some passages of his I`lam al-Muwaqqi`in he seems to suggest that any
Muslim is qualified to derive rulings directly from the Koran and Sunna. But in
other passages he takes a more intelligent view. For instance, he writes: �Is
it permissible for a mufti who adheres to the madhhab of his Imam to
give a fatwa in accordance with a different madhhab if that is
more correct in his view? [The answer is] if he is [simply] following the
principles of that Imam in procedures of ijtihad and ascertaining the
proof-texts [i.e. is a mujtahid fi�l-madhhab], then he is permitted to
follow the view of another mujtahid which he considers correct.� (I`lam
al-Muwaqqi`in, IV, 237.) This is a broad approach, but is nonetheless very
far from the notion of simply following the �dalil� every time rather
than following a qualified interpreter. This quote and several others are given
by Shaykh al-Buti to show the various opinions held by Ibn al-Qayyim on this
issue, which, according to the Shaykh, reveal �remarkable contradictions�.
(Al-Buti, 56-60.)
[66] Many of Ibn Taymiya�s works exist only as single
manuscripts; and even the others, when compared to the works of the great
scholars such as al-Suyuti and al-Nawawi, seem to have been copied only very
rarely. See the list of ancient manuscripts of his works given by C.
Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur (2nd. Ed.
Leiden, 1943-9), II, 126-7, Supplement, II, 119-126.
[67] `Abduh, in turn, was influenced by his teacher
and collaborator Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97). Afghani was associated with
that transitional �Young Ottoman� generation which created the likes of Namik
Kemal and (somewhat later) Zia Gokalp and Sati` al-Husari: men deeply
traumatized by the success of the Western powers and the spectacle of Ottoman
military failure, and who sought a cultural renewal by jettisoning historic
Muslim culture while maintaining authenticity by retaining a �pristine
essence�. In this they were inspired, consciously or otherwise, by the wider 19th
century quest for authenticity: the nationalist philosophers Herder and Le Bon,
who had outlined a similar revivalist-essentialist project for France and
Germany based on the �original sources� of their national cultures, had been
translated and were widely read in the Muslim world at the time. Afghani was
not a profound thinker, but his pamphlets and articles in the journal which he and
`Abduh edited, al-`Urwat al-Wuthqa, were highly influential. Whether he
believed in his own pan-Islamic ideology, or indeed in his attenuated and
anti-historicist version of Islam, is unclear. When writing in contexts far
from his Muslim readership he often showed an extreme scepticism. For instance,
in his debate with Renan concerning the decline of Arab civilization, he wrote
of Islam: �It is clear that where-ever it becomes established, this religion
tried to stifle the sciences and it was marvellously served in its designs by
despotism.� (Reply to Renan, translated by N. Keddie in An Islamic Response
to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din
�al-Afghani� (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), 183, 187. It is hardly
surprising that `Abduh should have worked so hard to suppress the Arabic
translation of this work!
Afghani�s reformist ideology led him to found a
national political party in Egypt, al-Hizb al-Watani, including not only
Muslims, but in which �all Christians and Jews who lived in the land of Egypt
were eligible for membership.� (Jamal Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of
Egyptian Nationalism (London, 1960), 16.) This departure from traditional
Islamic notions of solidarity can be seen as a product of Afghani�s specific attitude
to taqlid. But his pupil�s own fatwas were often far more
radical, perhaps because `Abduh�s �partiality for the British authority which
pursued similar lines of reform and gave him support� (Ahmed, 35). We are not
surprised to learn that the British governor of Egypt, Lord Cromer, wrote: �For
many years I gave to Mohammed Abdu all the encouragement in my power� (Lord
Cromer, Modern Egypt [ New York, 1908], II, 180). An example is the
declaration in `Abduh�s tafsir (much of which is by Rida) that the
erection of statues is halal. The same argument was being invoked by
Ataturk, who, when asked why he was erecting a statue of himself in Ankara,
claimed that �the making of statues is not forbidden today as it was when
Muslims were just out of idolatry, and that it is necessary for the Turks to
practice this art, for it is one of the arts of civilization�. (C. Adams, Islam
and Modernism in Egypt [London, 1933], 193-4.)
[68] A poorly-argued but well-financed example of a book in
this category is a short text by the Saudi writer al-Khajnadi, of which an
amended version exists in English. This text aroused considerable concern among
the ulema when it first appeared in the 1960s, and Shaykh Sa`id Ramadan
al-Buti�s book was in fact written specifically in refutation of it. The second
and subsequent editions of al-Buti�s work, which shows how Khajnadi
systematically misquoted and distorted the texts, contain a preface which
includes an account of a meeting between al-Buti and the Albanian writer Nasir
al-Din al-Albani, who was associated with Khajnadi�s ideas. The three-hour
meeting, which was taped, was curious inasmuch as al-Albani denied that
Khajnadi was stating that all Muslims can derive rulings directly from the
Koran and Sunna. For instance where Khajnadi makes the apparently misleading
statement that �As for the Madhhabs, these are the views and ijtihads
of the ulema on certain issues; and neither Allah nor His messenger have
compelled anyone to follow them,� Al-Albani explains that �anyone� (ahad)
here in fact refers to �anyone qualified to make ijtihad�. (Al-Buti,
13.) Al-Albani went on to cite several other instances of how readers had
unfortunately misunderstood Khajnadi�s intention. Shaykh al-Buti, quite
reasonably, replied to the Albanian writer: �No scholar would ever use language
in such a loose way and make such generalizations, and intend to say something
so different to what he actually and clearly says; in fact, no-one would
understand his words as you have interpreted them.� Albani�s response was: �The
man was of Uzbek origin, and his Arabic was that of a foreigner, so he was not
able to make himself as clear as an Arab would. He is dead now, and we should
give him the benefit of the doubt and impose the best interpretation we can on
his words!� (al-Buti, 14.) But al-Albani, despite his protestations, is
reliably said to believe even now that taqlid is unacceptable. Wa-la
hawla wa-la quawwata illa bi�Llah.
[69] The ulema also quote the following guiding
principles of Islamic jurisprudence: �That which is wrong (munkar) need
not be condemned as [objectively] wrong unless all scholars agree (in ijma`)
that it is so.� (Dajawi, II, 583.) Imam al-Dajawi (II, 575) also makes the
following points: �The differences of opinion among the ulema are a great mercy
(rahma) upon this Umma. `Umar ibn `Abd al-`Aziz declared: "It would
not please me if the Companions of Muhammad, upon whom be blessings and peace,
had not disagreed, for had they not done so, no mercy would have come
down." Yahya ibn Sa`id, one of the great hadith narrators among the
Followers (Tabi`un), said: "The people of knowledge are a people of
broadness (ahl tawsi`a). They continue to give fatwas which are
different from each other, and no scholar reproaches another scholar for his
opinion." However, if ordinary people took their rulings straight from the
Koran and Sunna, as a certain faction desires, their opinions would be far more
discordant than this, and the Four Schools would no longer be four, but
thousands. Should that day come, it will bring disaster upon disaster for the
Muslims - may we never live to see it!�
One could add that �that day� seems already to be
upon us, and that the resulting widening of the argument on even the most simple
juridical matters is no longer tempered by the erstwhile principles of
politeness and toleration. The fiercely insulting debate between Nasir al-Din
al-Albani and the Saudi writer al-Tuwayjiri is a typical instance. The former
writer, in his book Hijab al-Mar�a al-Muslima, uses the Koran and Sunna
to defend his views that a woman may expose her face in public; while the
latter, in his al-Sarim al-Mashhur `ala Ahl al-Tabarruj wa�l- Sufur,
attacks Albani in the most vituperative terms for failing to draw from the
revealed sources and supposedly obvious conclusion that women must always veil
their faces from non-mahram men. Other example of this bitter hatred
generation by the non-Madhhab style of discord, based in attempts at
direct istinbat, are unfortunately many. Hardly any mosque or Islamic
organization nowadays seems to be free of them.
The solution is to recall the principle referred to
above, namely that two mujtahids can hold differing opinions on the furu`,
and still be rewarded by Allah, while both opinions will constitute legitimate fiqh.
(Juwayni, ��1455-8; Bilmen, I, 249.) This is clearly indicated in the Koranic
verses: �And Daud and Sulayman, when they gave judgement concerning the
field, when people�s sheep had strayed and browsed therein by night; and We
were witness to their judgement. We made Sulayman to understand [the case]; and
unto each of them We gave judgement and knowledge.� (21:78-9) The two
Prophets, upon them be peace, had given different fatwas; and Sulayman�s
was the more correct, but as Prophets they were infallible (ma`sum), and
hence Daud�s judgement was acceptable also.
Understanding this is the key to recreating the
spirit of tolerance among Muslims. Shaykh Omer Bilmen summarizes the jurists�
position as follows: �The fundamentals of the religion, namely basic doctrine,
the obligatory status of the forms of worship, and the ethical virtues, are the
subject of universal agreement, an agreement to which everyone is religiously
obliged to subscribe. Those who diverge from the rulings accepted by the
overwhelming majority of ordinary Muslims are considered to be the people of bid`a
and misguidance, since the dalils (proof-texts) establishing them are
clear. But it is not a violation of any Islamic obligation for differences of opinion
to exist concerning the furu` (branches) and juz�iyyat (secondary
issues) which devolve from these basic principles. In fact, such differences
are a necessary expression of the Divine wisdom.� (Bilmen, I, 329.)
A further point needs elucidating. If the jurists
may legitimately disagree, how should the Islamic state apply a unified legal
code throughout its territories? Clearly, the law must be the same everywhere.
Imam al-Qarafi states the answer clearly: �The head of state gives a judgement
concerning the [variant rulings which have been reached by] ijtihad, and
this does away with the disagreement, and obliges those who follow ijtihad
verdicts which conflict with the head of state�s to adopt his verdict.�
(Qarafi, II, 103; affirmed also in Amidi, IV, 273-4.) Obviously this is a
counsel specifically for qadis, and applies only to questions of public
law, not to rulings on worship.
[70] This was understood as early as the 18th
century. Al-Buti quotes Shah Waliullah al-Dahlawi (Hujjat Allah al-Baligha,
I, 132) as observing: �The Umma up to the present date � has unanimously agreed
that these four recorded madhhabs may be followed by way of taqlid.
In this there are manifest benefits and advantages, especially in these days in
which enthusiasm has dimmed greatly, and souls have been given to drink of
their own passions, so that everyone with an opinion is delighted with his
opinion.� This reminds us that Islam is not a totalitarian religion which
denies the possibility and legitimacy of variant opinions. �The Muslim scholars
are agreed that the mujtahid cannot incur a sin in regard to his
legitimate ijtihad exercised to derive judgements of Shari`a.
[Only the likes of] Bishr al-Marisi, Ibn `Aliyya, Abu Bakr al-Asamm and the
deniers of qiyas, such as the Mu`tazilites and the Twelver Shi`a,
believe that there is only one true ruling in each legal issue, so that whoever
does not attain to it is a sinner.� (Amidi, IV, 244.) This is of course an
aspect of the Divine mercy, and a token of the sane and generous breadth of
Islam. �Allah desires ease for you, not difficulty.� (Koran, 2:185) �I am sent
to make things easy, not to make them more difficult.� (Bukhari, `Ilm, 12.)
�Never was Allah�s Messenger, may blessings and peace be upon him, given the
choice between two options but that he chose the easier of them, unless it was
a sin.� (Bukhari, Manaqib, 23.) But the process lamented in Dahlawi�s day, by
which people simply ignored this Sunna principle, has nowadays become far more
poisonous. What is particularly damaging is that egos have become so powerful
that the old Muslim adab of polite tolerance during debate has been lost
in some circles, as people find it hard to accept that other Muslims might hold
opinions that differ from their own. It must be realized that if Allah tells
Musa (upon him be peace) to speak �gently� to Pharoah (20:43), and commands us
�not to debate with the People of the Book save in a most excellent way,�
(29:46) then how much more important must it be to debate politely with people
who are neither Pharoahs nor Christians, but are of our own religion?
[71] Probably because of an underlying insecurity,
many young Muslim activists cannot bear to admit that they might not know
something about their religion. And this despite the example of Imam Malik,
who, when asked forty questions about fiqh, answered �I do not know� (la
adri) to thirty-six of them. (Amidi, IV, 221; Bilmen, I, 239.) How many
egos nowadays can bear to admit ignorance even once? They should remember the
saying: �He who makes most haste to give a fatwa, makes most haste to
the Fire.� (Bilmen, I, 255.) Imam al-Subki condemns �those who make haste to
give fatwas, relying on the apparent meaning of the [revealed] phrases
without thinking deeply about them, thereby dragging other people into
ignorance, and themselves into the agonies of the Fire.� (Taj al-Din al-Subki, Mu`id
al-Ni`am wa-Mubid al-Niqam (Brill, 1908), 149. Even Imam al-Sha`bi (d.103),
out of his modesty and adab, and his awareness of the great complexity
of the fiqh, did not consider himself a mufti, only a naqil
(transmitter of texts). (Bilmen, I, 256.)
[72] Cf. Imam al-Dajawi, II, 579: �By Allah, this view (that
ordinary people should not follow madhhabs) is nothing less than an
attempt to fling the door wide open for people�s individual preferences,
thereby turning the Book and the Sunna into playthings to be manipulated by
those deluded fools, driven by their compounded ignorance and their corrupt
imaginings. It is obvious that personal preferences vary enormously, and that
ignorant people will arrive at their conclusions on the basis of their own
emotions and imaginings. So what will be the result if we put them in authority
over the Shari`a, so that they are able to interpret it in the light of
their own opinions, and play with it according to their preferences?�
[73] Buti, 107-8. The same image is used by Imran
Nyazee: �Taqlid, as distinguished from blind conversatism, is the
foundation of all relationships based on trust, like those between a patient
and his doctor, a client and his lawyer, and a business and its accountant. It
is a legal method for ensuring that judges who are not fully-qualified
mujtahids may be able to decide cases in the light of precedents laid down by
independent jurists � The system of taqlid implies that as long as the
layman does not get the training for becoming a doctor he cannot practice
medicine, for example. In the case of medicine such a person may be termed a
quack and may even be punished today, but in the case of Islamic law he is assuming
a much graver responsibility: he is claiming that the opinion he is expressing
is the law intended by Allah.� (Introduction to The Distinguished Jurist�s
Primer, xxxv.)
[74] It hardly needs adding, as a final observation, that
nothing in all the above should be understood as an objection to the extension
and development of the fiqh in response to modern conditions. Much
serious ijtihad is called for; the point being made in this paper is
simply that such ijtihad must be carried out by scholars qualified to do
so.
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